Master and Servant—Workmen\u27s Compensation Act—Accidental Injury Suffered in the Course of Employment by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 12 Issue 4 
January 1927 
Master and Servant—Workmen's Compensation Act—Accidental 
Injury Suffered in the Course of Employment 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Master and Servant—Workmen's Compensation Act—Accidental Injury Suffered in the Course of 
Employment, 12 ST. LOUIS L. REV. 302 (1927). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss4/12 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
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of a illegal transaction or intrusted it to the agent for an illegal purpose.
Nave v. Wilson, 12 Ind. A. 38, 38 N. E. 876; Clarke, Harrison & Co. v. Brown,
77 Ga. 606; Munns v. Donovan Comm. Co., 117 Ia. 516, 91 N. W. 789; Morgan
v. Groff, 4 Barb. (N. Y.) 524. No question of par delictum could possibly enter
into the principal case to defeat the plaintiff's action, as in Garland v. Isbell, 139
Ga. 64, 76 S. E. 591, which was a suit to determine which of the parties was the
rightful winner of a lottery prize. A comparison between that case and Mar-
tin v. Hodge, supra, brings out well the distinction between a suit in which
plaintiff relies upon the lottery to make out his case and an action in which he
makes out cause of action without reference to the lottery. R. L. A. '29.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-AcCIDENTAL INJURY
SUFFERED IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT.-The Workmen's Compensation Act
of Illinois provides compensation for "accidental injuries or death suffered in
the course of employment." A young girl, employed in a factory in the city
of Westville, Illinois, contracted typhoid fever, and died as a result of the ill-
ness. From fifteen to thirty girls employed in the same factory were treated
at the time for typhoid fever and the weight of evidence established that the
deceased had contracted the disease through the medium of drinking water
furnished in the factory. The parents of the girl were awarded compensation
for her death by an arbitrator, the award was affirmed by the Industrial Com-
mission. Held, the ruling of the commission was correct, and the death resulted
from "an accidental injury suffered in the course of employment." Rissman &
Son v. Ind. Commission, 323 Ill. 459, 154 N. E. 203.
Both English and American decisions recognize the fact that there are cer-
tain acts necessary to the life, comfort, and convenience of the servant while at
work, which, though strictly personal to himself, are incidental to the service,
and an injury sustained in the performance of such an act is deemed to have
arisen "in the course of employment" Hence, injuries occasioned while the
employee was preparing to eat lunch have been compensated. Clem v. Chalmers
Motor Co., 178 Mich. 340; Blouss v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 73 Pa. Super.
Ct. 95; Haller v. City of Lansing, 195 Mich. 753. Also injuries incurred while
the servant attempted to care for his own comfort are suffered in the course of
employment. Benson v. Bush, 104 Kan. 198; Evans v. The Peterson, 28 Times
L. R. 18. An indulgence in tobacco, satisfying a natural want, should be
necessarily contemplated by the employer, and an injury incidental to such an
act occurs in the course of employment. Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. In-
dustrial Accident Commission, 178 Cal. 505; Dzikowska v. Superior Steel Co.,
259 Pa. 578; Springer v. North, 200 N. Y. S. 248; Kaletha v. Hall Mercantile
Co., 157 Minn. 290. A workman injured while washing in preparation to go
home after his day of work can recover compensation. Hollenbach Co. v. Hol-
lenbach, 181 Ky. 262. Stopping work to take a drink of water is incidental to
the employment. In re Osterbrink, 229 Mass. 407; Gililand v. Edgar Zinc Co.,
112 Kan. 39; Widdell Co. v. Industrial Commission of Wisconsin, 180 Wis. 179;
Archibald v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 448. Other cases involving personal incidental
services to the same effect are Zabriskia v. Erie Ry. Co., 85 N. J. L. 157; Weldon
v Skinner & Eddy Corp., 103 Wash. 243; Morris v. Lambeth, 22 Times L. R.
22, and Leach v. Oakley Co. (1911), 1 K. B. 523. In the light of such decisions,
many of which were decided under identical statutes, the Illinois Court was
certainly justified in holding that the injury to the deceased occurred "in the
course of employment."
The troublesome question concerning the case under discussion is whether
the contraction of typhoid germs through drinking water is an "accidental in-
jury" under the Act. A prior Illinois decision, Christ v. Pacific Mutual Life
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Ins. Co., 312 Ill. 525, held that the contraction of typhoid fever may be regarded
as accidental if the disease is contracted by accidental means. In Frankamp v.
Fordney Hotel, 222 Mich. 525, an accident is defined to mean an unforeseen
event occurring without the will or design of the person whose mere act causes
it. That case specifically held that the contraction of typhoid fever from drink-
ing water was an accidental injury. Other cases in accord are Ames v. Lake
Independence Lumber Co., 226 Mich. 83; Wiltfong v. Lake Independent Lumber
Co., 226 Mich, 91; Brodin's Case, 124 Me. 162; Vennen v. New Dells Co., 161
Wis. 370; Wasmuth-Endicott v. Karst, 77 Ind. App. 279. Two cases, contra,
State ex rel Fairbault Woolen Mills et al. v. District Court of Rice County,
138 Minn. 210, and Industrial Commission v. Cross, 104 Ohio St. 561, can be
distinguished because of differences in the Workmen's Compensation Acts under
which they were decided. It would seem to follow that the case of John Riss-
man & Son v. Industrial Commission, the instant case, is decided on well es-
tablished principles and is in accord with modern decisions. F. A. E. '28.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs-LIABILITY FOR ToRTs-PRoxIMATE CAusF-Plain-
tiff was riding a bicycle. The wheel of a passing truck dropped into a hole in
the cartway causing mud to splash in the plaintiff's eyes. Small stones in the
mud penetrated the plaintiff's eye and caused loss of sight of the eye. Held, in
an action against the city, that the defect in the street caused the passing ve-
hicle to splash the mud in the plaintiff's eye, that such defect was the proximate
cause of the injury, and that the city was liable. Stemmler v. City of Pittsburgh,
(1926) 287 Pa. 365, 135 Atl. 100.
This case is interesting because of the indirect nature of city's liability.
Municipal corporations are bound to keep streets in reasonably safe condition.
Failing to do so makes them liable for all injuries due to such negligence. Bas-
sett v. St. Joseph, 53 Mo. 290. In Twist v. City of Rochester, 55 N. Y. S. 850,
the court held that a city must use reasonable care in keeping its streets safe
for public use, and if any injury results to a traveller it cannot claim exemption
from liability because its streets are public. Authorities are practically uniform
in holding a city liable for injuries resulting from its negligence in failing to
keep streets in repair even though the defective street was not the sole cause
of the injury. Belleville v. Hoffman, 74 Ill. App. 503. Thus a city was liable
where the injury was produced as a result partly of a defect in the street, and
partly of nature of the accident. Lacon v. Page, 48 Ill. 499; Vogel v. City of
West Plains, 73 Mo. App. 588; Barrett v. Savannah, 9 Ga. App. 642, 72 S. E. 49;
Vogelsan v. City of St. Louis, 139 Mo. 127, 40 S. W. 653. In Joliet v. Shufelt,
144 Ili. 403, 32 N. E. 969, the city was held liable where a street was negli-
gently constructed and plaintiff was thrown from his buggy and injured even
though the accident would not have occurred if the horses's harness had not
broken. If, however, the injuries are a result of a collision with a fire-truck
the city is not liable although a defect in the street contributed to the collision.
City of Louisville v. Bridwell, 150 Ky. 589, 150 S. W. 672; Or if the plaintiff's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury there can be no recovery
against the city even though the street was defective. De Camp v. Sioux City,
74 Ia. 392, 37 N. W. 971. E. C. F. '27.
NEGLIGENCE-MOTOR VEHICLES-DUTY OwED By DRIVER TO SELF-INITED
GuEsT.-The plaintiff in this case was a widow who was employed in Pine Bluff.
The defendant was going to Little Rock by automobile and the plaintiff, who
was anxious to see her children living there, obtained the defendant's permis-
sion to accompany him. The testimony introduced by the plaintiff tended to
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol12/iss4/12
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show that the automobile in which they made the trip was turned over on ac-
count of fast driving by the defendant, which resulted in injury to the plaintiff.
The trial court instructed a verdict for the defendant on the theory that the
only duty he owed the plaintiff while riding in his automobile as a self-invited
guest was to refrain from injuring her willfully or wantonly. The testimony
failed to reveal any evidence of a willful or wanton attempt on the part of the
defendant to injure the plaintiff. Held, error to instruct a verdict on this the-
ory. Justice Humphreys was of the opinion that the driver of an automobile
was required to exercise ordinary care in the operation thereof, to transport
his passengers safely, whether guests by sufferance, self-invited guests, or in-
vited guests. Two of the other Justices thought that in a gratuitous carriage
for the sole benefit of the guest only slight diligence is required of the driver,
and he becomes liable only for gross neglect. Black v. Goldweber, 291 S. W.
(Ark.) 76.
The case is peculiar in that it presents the three theories of the liability of an
automobile driver for injuries sustained by a guest in the course of the ride.
The theory of the trial court is followed in only two or three jurisdictions.
These decisions preserve the distinction between invitee and bare licensee and
they apply the general rule of duty to bare licensees to owners and drivers of
automobiles and other vehicles. The injured party having solicited the ride,
the act of the driver in acceding to the request possessed none of the elements
of a contract and the driver is liable only if the injury to the self-invited guest
is inflicted willfully or wantonly. See Lutvin v. Dopkus, 94 N. J. L. 64; Crider
v. Yolande Coal & Coke Co., 206 Ala. 71 89 So. 285; Reed v. Rideout's Am-
bulance, 212 Ala. 428.
Another respectable minority of courts, clinging to the distinction between the
degrees of care, hold that a gratuitous carrier owes only slight diligence to an
invitee, and the driver of an automobile therefore is not liable for the injury of
a guest unless such injury is the result of gross negligence on the part of the
driver. See Marcinowski v. Sanders, (Mass.) 147 N. E. 275; Massaletti v. Fit.-
roy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N. E. 168; Epps v. Parish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106, S. E.
297.
By far the majority of the courts follow the rule as cited by Justice
Humphreys, that the driver of an automobile is required to exercise ordinary or
reasonable care in the operation thereof, to transport his passengers safely,
whether guests by sufferance, self-invited guests, or invited guests. These de-
cisions abolish the distinction between bare licensee and invitee and apply the
rple to guests at sufferance as well as to guests by invitation. The driver, hav-
ing accepted the passenger, owes him the duty of exercising reasonable care,
and not unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the
hazard of travel. Recent decisions in the various states recognizing this rule
are Sheehan v. Foster, 251 Pac. (Cal.) 235; Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 98
Conn. 87; Munson v. Rupker, 148 N. E. (Ind. App.) 169; Mayberry v. Sivcy, 18
Kan. 291; Beard v. Klusmeier, 158 Ky. 153; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 141 La. 272;
Fitziarrell v. Boyd, 123 Md. 497; Hemington v. Hemington, 221 Mich. 206, 190
N. W. 683; Rappaport v. Stockdale, 160 Minn. 78, 199 N. W. 513; Great South-
ern Lumber Co. v. Hamilton, 137 Miss. 55, 101 So. 787; Alley v. Wall, 272 S. W.
(Mo. App.) 999; Liston v. Reynolds, 69 Mont. 480, 223 Pac. 507; Batter v. Griess,
105 Neb. 381, 181 N. W. 156; Clark v. Traver, 200 N. Y. S. 52; Mitchell v. South-
ern Ry., 176 N. C. 645, 97, S. E. 628; Grabau v. Pudwill, 45 N. D. 423, 178 N. W.
124; Farrell v. Solski, 123 At. (Pa.) 423; Leonard v. Bartle, 135 At. (R. I.)
853; Tennessee Central Ry. Co. v. Vanhoy, 143 Tenn. 312, 226 S. W. 225; Moore-
field v. Lewis, 96 W. Va. 112, 123 S. E. 564; Glick v. Baer, 86 Wis. 268, 201
N. W. 752; Ryan v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 196, 211 Pac. 482. F. A. E. '28.
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RAPE-REsiSTANCE OF FEMALE-CHARGE RELATING TO OuTcRY.-The defendant
was charged with common law rape. He admitted the act of sexual intercourse
with the prosecutrix but denied that it was without her consent. The evidence
clearly established that the prosecutrix had received a serious injury from some
source; her jaw was fractured and she was semiconscious for many hours. The
alleged offense occurred a distance of from 350 to 500 feet from the defendant's
car. Another young couple of the party had remained in the car and testified
that they heard no outcry from the prosecutrix. The testimony of the defendant
and the prosecutrix on this point was in conflict. The defendant requested the
following instruction: "If the jury believed from the evidence that, at the time
the offense is alleged to have been committed, the prosecuting witness made no
outcry, and was in a position to have made an outcry, or could have made others
hear who were in close proximity, then you should take this into consideration
with all the other evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the respond-
ent, and whether a rape was in fact committed or not." This instruction was
refused, but the court did charge as follows: "In determining her power to re-
sist you must take into consideration all the facts connected with the time and
place at which the act of intercourse took place, her physical powers at that time,
the resistance she was able to make, her ability to summon help, in any way in
her power, by screaming or otherwise. You are to consider all these things
from the evidence that has been brought before you." The defendant was con-
victed and on appeal the court was divided four to four. Conviction affirmed.
People v. Rich, (Mich. 1927) 212 N. W. 105.
The general rule is that in a prosecution for common law rape proof of the
failure of the female to make an outcry, where the transaction occurred in a place
not so remote from human help that the outcry would be unavailing, is for the
consideration of the jury in determining the question of consent or non-consent.
State v. Cross, 12 Ia. 66, 79 Am. Dec. 519; Oleson v. State, 11 Neb. 276, 9 N. W.
38. It is reversible error to refuse to instruct the jury that if the prosecutrix
made no outcry it raised a strong presumption that no rape had been committed.
Barney v. People, 22 11. 160. The Missouri doctrine is that where the act is
committed within probable hearing of other persons a failure to make an outcry
is a circumstance which would justify a strong, but not conclusive, inference that
the act was with the consent of the prosecutrix and not by force, and that a re-
fusal to charge that it was for the consideration of the jury to determine
whether, in fact, rape had been committed, constituted reversible error. State
v. Witten, 100 Mo. 525, 13 S. W. 871. Where the prosecutrix testified she be-
lieved she was too remote from human habitation and the accused testified that
the intercourse was voluntary, the court on proper request must charge that the
failure to make an outcry might be considered in connection with the other
facts as showing want of resistance. Jackson v. State, 92 Ark. 71, 122 S. W.
101. It is not reversible error to refuse to charge that an outcry was necessary
for conviction where the prosecutrix was an epileptic just above the age of con-
sent, Eberhart v. State, 134 Ind. 651, 34 N. E. 637; or under the statutory age of
consent, Moore v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. 604, 236 S. W. 477; or in "a mental stupor
from alcoholic drink, which made her insensible and incapable of consenting,"
Quinn v. State, 153 Wis. 573, 142 N. W. 510. In the instant case the four judges
for reversal of the conviction placed their judgment on the ground that the
charge given was too general and that the defendant was entitled to a specific
charge, hypothetically stated, of his theory upon this branch of the case which
was supported by evidence. On the other hand, the four judges for affirmance
of the conviction believed that the substance of the instruction requested was
embodied in the charge given; that the charge given did not mislead the jury
and did not prejudice the defendant. The latter position finds support in the
case of State v. Ingraham, 118 Minn. 13, 136 N. W. 258, in which it was held that
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a refusal to charge that the prosecutrix must use her "voice by calling for aid or
giving an alarm" did not constitute error where the court did instruct that she
must resist "to the utmost extent of her ability." T. S. '27.
SALE OF REGISTERED AUTOMOBILE WITHOUT ASSIGNMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF
TITLE IS VOID UNDER MISSOURI STATUTE.-Defendant bought an automobile
from a company into whose hands plaintiff had delivered it for sale. Plaintiff
had made no assignment of the certificate of title as required by the Motor
Vehicle Act of 1921, Special Session, page 88, section 18, which requires an as-
signment, and provides that failure to comply with the statute renders the trans-
action fraudulent and void. He sued in replevin for the recovery of the auto-
mobile. The trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff and was sustained by
the St. Louis Court of Appeals. Held, that the provision of the statute was
mandatory and all sales without compliance therewith were fraudulent and void.
Quinn v. Gehlert (Mo. 1927) 291 S. W. 138.
The decision of the court is based on the earlier decision of the Supreme
Court of Missouri which first construed the statute and held the same to be
mandatory. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co. v. Cox, 306 Mo. 537, 268 S. W. 87, 37
A. L. R. 1456. In this case the purchaser of an automobile had not had the cer-
tificate of title assigned to him but had talen out insurance on the vehicle. A
loss occurred and he sued for the insurance It was held that the sale was void
and the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the automobile and hence could not
recover. The statute is held to be mandatory the court, quoting with approval
the statement of counsel, said: "The law as settled in Missouri seems to be that
a disregard or a violation of positive law cannot be a consideration for a valid
contract and that such contracts will not be enforced in our courts and this
whether the act which is forbidden either at common law or by statutory law is
ialum in se or merely malum prohibituni."
The court then cites numerous cases in which similar statutes were held
mandatory and contracts in violation of the statute held void and unenforceable.
Failure to comply with positive statute prohibiting possession of certain game
during certain seasons of the year in that the contract sued on involved the pos-
session of the game within the prohibited season was held void. Haggerty v.
St. Louis Ice Mfg. & Storage Co., 143 Mo. 238. Sale of a lot made without
compliance with statute requiring plat of town to be made out, acknowledged,
and recorded before sale, held void. Downing v. Ringer, 7 Mo. 585. Contracts
made by foreign corporations which have not complied with the statute and se-
cured a license to do business in the state, held void and unenforceable. Tri-
State Amusement Co. v. Forest Park Highland Amusement Co., 192 Mo. 404.
There are few cases in other jurisdictions on this precise point and most of them
are collected in the note, following the Connecticut Fire Insurance Case in 37
A. L. R. 1465. Most of the cases follow the rule laid down by the Missouri
court and declare the transaction void when the statute had not been complied
with. A vendor is not allowed to recover the purchase price from the vendee if
the title has not been transferred in the manner required by the statute.
Arotzky v. Kropintzky, (1923) 98 N. J. L. 344. And this is true even though
notes have been given by the purchaser. Swank v. Moisan, 85 Ore. 662.
Kansas courts seem to follow this general rule. Hammond Motor Co. v. War-
ren, 213 P. 810. In this case a mortgagee was allowed to replevin the automobile
which had been sold by the mortgagor without making the assignment of the
title required. On almost the same facts as the instant case a Texas court in
Ferris v. Langston, 253 S. W. 309, held the same as the Missouri court, and for
some time this was the doctrine of the Texas courts. Recent decisions have ef-
fected a complete reversal, however, and it is now held in that state that failure
to comply with the statute will not void the transaction which is otherwise valid.
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